Appearance Emotionalism in Music: Analysis and Criticism

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I

My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first part, I will be concerned with an exegetical problem in Stephen Davies's theory of emotional expressiveness, appearance emotionalism. Particularly, I am interested in Davies's characterization of the phenomenology of expressive music. On the basis of textual analysis, I will outline two different possibilities in the phenomenological commitments advanced by appearance emotionalism: a thick and a thin characterization of the experience of expressive music. I will contend that the thick characterization is the better interpretive option, both on the ground of textual evidence and overall strength of the theory.

In the second part of the paper, I will contend that appearance emotionalism, interpreted in the way mandated by my discussion, faces a problem, as it fails to account for a range of musical properties that should count as expressive properties under Davies's own view of emotional states. In doing so, I will build on a recent criticism of appearance emotionalism I put forward,[1] as well as on Davies's reply.[2]

II

Philosophical theories of musical expressiveness are usually concerned with a characterization of the phenomenology of expressive perception in music, aiming at a description of the sort of experience that one is undergoing when listening to expressive music. Unlike arousal theories, resemblance theories do not consider emotional arousal an essential element of such experience. Rather, they suggest that the perception of a resemblance between the music and human expressive behavior may lie at the core of the experience of expressive music.

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In Davies's case, it is unclear what sort of experience he takes to be essential to expressive perception in music. Appearance emotionalism is committed to the idea that emotion characteristics in appearance have a crucial importance for the music's emotional character. Emotion characteristics in appearance are the external, public manifestations of emotions. The first part of this paper examines the role played by emotion characteristics in appearance in Davies's theory. While the textual evidence I discuss could point to multiple interpretations, I will focus on two. Consider these formulations of appearance emotionalism (in chronological order):

[1] [M]usic is experienced as having features displayed in human behaviour, especially the features of behaviour which give rise to the emotion-characteristic in appearances.[3]

[2] In the first and basic case, music is expressive by presenting not instances of emotions but emotion characteristics in appearances. Our experience of musical works and, in particular, of motion in music is like our experience of the kinds of behavior which, in human beings, gives rise to emotion characteristics in appearance.[4]

[3] I believe that the expressiveness of music depends mainly on a resemblance we perceive between the dynamic character of music and human movement, gait, bearing, or carriage.[5]

[4] I think music is expressive in recalling the gait, attitude, air, carriage, posture, and comportment of the human body.[6]

[5] One possibility is that the form of music maps the dynamic structure of the physiological patterning of emotions. Another is that music is experienced as resembling expressive human utterances and vocalizations. A third, I think more plausible, suggestion is that the movement of music is experienced in the same way that bodily bearings or comportments indicative of a person's emotional states are. In other words, music is experienced as dynamic, as are human action and behavior. And when music is experienced as like behaviors presenting characteristic appearances of emotion, it is experienced as similar to the behaviors not only in its dynamic profile but also in its expressive profile. . . . Harmonic and textual clarity go with happy music, while harmonic density and unresolved tension go with sad music, and again, these are experienced as resembling the outward-directed openness and enthusiasm with which happy people greet the world and the inward self-absorption and gloom that misery brings on.[7]

[6] We experience music as presenting emotion characteristics in its aural appearance and attribute them [emotion terms] accordingly. But on what basis do we do so? As is clear from earlier examples, we do so because we experience music as presenting an appearance that resembles characteristic human behavioral displays of affect.[8]

As anticipated, in these various formulations, we can distinguish two main analyses.

Formulations [1], [3], [4], [5] and [6] suggest a *thick characterization* of the experience of expressive music. Music is experienced *as presenting emotion* characteristics in appearance (as in [6]), or is experienced *as having* characteristics displayed in human behavior (as in [1]), or is perceived *as resembling* bodily expressive behavior (as in [3]), or *recalls* the expressive comportment of the human body (as in [4]). What unifies these formulations is the presence of emotion characteristics in appearance. Regardless of how the thick characterization may be refined, such a description of the phenomenology of expressive perception is committed to the idea that emotion characteristics in appearance figure in the experience of expressive music.[9]

On the other hand, formulation [2] points to a different account. It offers a *minimal characterization* of the experience of expressive music: to have such an experience is to experience a resemblance between the experience of expressive music and the experience of human expressive behavior, or simply to have an experience that is relevantly *like* the experience of human expressive behavior. Again, I am not interested in the detailed way in which this view may be fleshed out and refined. What interests me is that the minimal characterization, unlike the thick one, does not include emotion characteristics in appearance in the content of the experience of expressive perception.[10]

Rather than being concerned with the exegetical task of exploring Davies's various formulations in detail, I want to isolate central elements in his analysis to identify a core phenomenological characterization. Regardless of how Davies would further qualify his position if pressed to do so, in what follows my aim is to single out the elements that would have to belong to any qualification of the account.

The strategy I will adopt is to show that appearance emotionalism cannot reduce the experience of expressive music to the minimal characterization, on pain of losing some of its central features. This suggests that the only viable interpretive solution—at least among the ones currently on offer—is provided by the thick characterization: appearance emotionalism is committed to the claim that emotion characteristics in appearance are in some sense part of the phenomenology of expressive perception in music.

There are three main reasons that the minimal characterization does not fit well with other features of appearance emotionalism.

First, the minimal characterization is committed to the claim according to which human expressive behavior is in no way part of the phenomenology of music listening. This leaves unexplained the role emotion characteristics in appearance play in the account. If emotion characteristics in appearance do not figure in the phenomenology of expressive perception in music, where do they find their place?

Emotion characteristics in appearance are crucial for an important feature of appearance emotionalism, namely, its defense of literalism regarding

the attribution of expressive properties to music. According to Davies, emotion words are applied to music literally, and this literal application is grounded in the music's presentation of emotion characteristics in appearance: because music presents such appearances, we apply to it the emotional term we may apply to human beings that display similar expressive behavior, regardless of their actual emotional state.[11] The use of emotion words in descriptions of music is a case of polysemy, in that the meaning of emotion words in the central psychological case is related, but not identical, to their meaning when applied to music, as in the latter case emotion words only refer to the observable manifestations of emotions.

However, according to the minimal characterization, emotion characteristics in appearance are not part of the experience of expressive music. From this, it follows that accepting the minimal characterization would require Davies to relocate emotion characteristics in appearance at a level at which they may still ground the literal application of emotion words to music. If he fails to do so, he would lose his literalist strategy.

At this point, a defender of the minimal characterization may reply that emotion characteristics in appearance play a role in the causal mechanisms responsible for expressive perception. Perhaps the way in which auditory cues are automatically processed by the brain is fundamentally analogous to the way in which we process human expressive behavior.

My qualm regarding this reply is not only that, being an empirical claim, it makes unclear the philosophical import of appearance emotionalism. More importantly, it is unclear how locating emotion characteristics in appearance at the causal level would allow appearance emotionalism to preserve the strength of its literalist strategy: whether the application of emotion words to music is literal (a case of polysemous use of words) or metaphorical is arguably independent of our discoveries regarding the causal mechanisms responsible for the expressive perception of music. If emotion characteristics in appearance need to have a place in Davies's literalist strategy, they need to be situated at a different level than the causal one.

Second, appearance emotionalism is able to account for the limited number of emotions music may express. It does so by restricting this number to the emotions that may be identified through their characteristics in appearance. As Davies writes,

> If the theory that in hearing the emotions expressed in music we are hearing emotion-characteristics in sounds in much the way that we see emotion-characteristics in appearances is correct, then we might expect that the limited range of emotion-characteristics that can be worn by appearances corresponds with the limited range of emotions that may be expressed in music.[12]

If the range of emotions expressible in music is indeed limited, then appearance emotionalism has the advantage of offering a prediction regarding the

scope of musical expressiveness that squares with the evidence we have from informed listening practices.[13]

However, this supposed advantage is no longer available if the experience of expressive music is described in the way mandated by the minimal characterization, as this excludes emotion characteristics in appearance from the phenomenology of expressive perception. The minimal characterization describes the experience of expressive music as an experience that is akin to the experience of human expressive behavior. But such a characterization is too indeterminate to result in a prediction concerning the music's expressive scope.

Third, if we accept the minimal characterization, it is hard to see how it could be possible for Davies to engage in the debate concerning what sort of expressive behavior, between bodily and vocal, is the most relevant to the perception of musical expressiveness. Davies contends on various occasions that the music's resemblance to bodily behavior is more prominent than its resemblance to nonverbal emotional vocalizations.[14] But this claim makes sense only if the phenomenological characterization of expressive perception in music is thick enough to include a mode-specific presentation of human emotional characteristics in appearance. While this is clearly allowed by the thick characterization, it is hard to see how it could be possible if we accept the minimal one.

One may reply that the minimal characterization does not specify that the experienced resemblance between the experience of music and the experience of human expressive behavior need be neutral as to sensory modality. There may be two different experiences, one occurring when we perceive bodily expression and the other typical of the perception of vocal expression. The dispute about which modality is the most relevant for music would be a dispute about which of these two experiences the experience of expressive music normally resembles more. While I have no decisive objection against this reply, it is hard to make sense of the distinction between the two experiences. In light of the other difficulties encountered by the minimal characterization, postulating a difference between the two experiences looks suspiciously like an *ad hoc* move.

If the reasons I offered above are compelling, a thick characterization makes appearance emotionalism a more coherent and powerful theory than a thin one. The thick characterization could be fleshed out and refined in various ways. What all of these qualifications will have in common is that emotion characteristics in appearance will figure in the phenomenology of expressive perception in music.

III

In the remainder of this paper, I wish to draw attention to an objection raised against Davies's appearance emotionalism. In a recent contribution,

I claimed that some descriptions of music in terms of emotional qualities cannot be accounted for by referring to the resemblance between the music and human expressive behavior.[15] I discussed these problematic cases under the heading of "secondary polysemy," a term I chose to echo Wittgenstein's discussion of secondary sense, as well as to stress the impossibility to make sense of such cases under Davies's account of the polysemous use of emotion words in descriptions of music. While discussion of secondary meanings in Wittgenstein is a topic that largely exceeds the limit and scope of this paper, two features of these meanings are important to understand my account of secondary polysemy. *First*, understanding secondary meanings requires familiarity with the "primary" application of words.[16] *Second*, and more importantly, the application of words in their secondary sense cannot be justified beyond our propensity to use words in such a way. This positive claim has a negative upshot: appeal to resemblance is of no use when trying to justify the use of words in their (Wittgensteinian) secondary sense.

A relevant example of secondary meaning is the use of the word "strains" in the mental and bodily sense.[17] We are inclined to see as natural the use of the same word in the two different domains, and our immediate justification for this use may be that there is an obvious similarity between the two kinds of strains. However, Wittgenstein observes that we are also unable to specify in what sense the two cases are similar. Explanations of the similarity are limited to rewordings of the original description.

Wittgenstein explicitly traces a distinction between such cases and cases of mere homonymy—such as "bank" used to refer to both the riverside and the financial institution. While in these cases the two meanings are entirely unrelated, this is not the case in instances of secondary sense. It is then clear that he did not intend to suggest that these cases were of homonymy but rather a peculiar case of polysemy. Other examples of secondary sense include that of "bitter" used to describe a flavor[18] but also a sorrow, or "high" used to describe a location in space as well as the character of a sound.[19]

My contention is that examples of secondary sense are also found in emotional descriptions of music. For this claim to be true, one would need to find cases in which the application of emotion words to music cannot be justified in terms of the resemblance between the music and human expressive behavior. I pointed to three such cases.

First, there are cases of expressive musical features that cannot be seen as resembling human emotional behavior, at least not unambiguously. I consider the ascending glissando that opens Gershwin's *Rhapsody in Blue* to be an example of this. I observed that, while the glissando, heard in its musical context, sounds "elated," it could resemble just as well a piercing cry or other vocal expression of anguish.[20] Regardless of the sort of similarity that is supposed to ground the elated character of the glissando, it is unclear why

this similarity should be more prominent than the one with vocal expression of a different emotional sort.

Second, I drew attention to the expressive character of musical timbre. This is hardly ever amenable to a resemblance between the timbre and vocal expressive behavior. As I claimed, "[A] saturated, dark timbre, rich in overtones and using a low register, has a menacing character."[21] The resemblance theorist's temptation to make sense of this by appealing to the resemblance to the speaking voice is bound to fail, as timbre is not a behavioral correlate of emotions. Rather, what makes both a speaking voice and a musical timbre "menacing" is the more elementary expressive character of features common to both. Such expressive character needs a more basic explanation than the one offered by appearance emotionalism.

Third, I noted that musical tension and relaxation is not related to psychological tension and relaxation in virtue of some specifiable resemblance; the chief example here is the tension in the tritone as a harmonic interval. Much like the Wittgensteinian case of mental and bodily strains, musical and psychological tension are "alike" in a more fundamental way than the one that figures in the stock examples of appearance emotionalism. While one can point to features of a musical contour that ground the resemblance between a melodic line and bodily carriage or posture, "what the tritone shares with a tense voice is nothing but its *being* tense, or rather, the fact that it seems to be aptly described as 'tense.'"[22]

These examples show that appearance emotionalism fails to account adequately for all cases of musical expressiveness. The cases presented above cannot be described as examples of polysemous application of emotion words to music in order to refer to the behavioral manifestation of emotions. As already mentioned, I called these problematic examples instances of "secondary polysemy." A viable account of musical expressiveness should account for secondary polysemy in the application of emotion words to music.

IV

In this section, I explore the pedagogical upshot of what I have claimed so far. It is reasonable to predict that perceptual features that are expressive in the secondary sense will interfere with those that are expressive in the sense described by appearance emotionalism. As an example, consider that of a timbre (expressive in the secondary sense) applied to a melodic contour (expressive in the sense described by appearance emotionalism). Matching expressive properties (for example, dark timbre / sad contour) should be judged more expressive than they would be if presented on their own. Non-matching presentations (bright timbre / sad contour) should be judged as

less expressive. Moreover, agreement as to the music's expressive character should be higher in the matching cases than in the nonmatching ones.

These predictions may be developed into an empirical program aimed at testing my claims regarding the expressive import of features that are expressive in the secondary sense. However, it is their pedagogical upshot that interests me here. Because it is impossible to ground the expressive import of secondary expressive properties in a resemblance to emotion characteristics in appearance, secondary expressiveness may be unjustly downplayed in aesthetic education. Perceptual features that are expressive in the secondary sense may thus slip into an ineffable no man's land and be neglected or belittled simply because they are harder to deal with when it comes to grounding their expressive character in observable, describable features, such as a melodic contour's resemblance to carriage and gait.

However, the experimental framework described above may be easily reworked into an exercise aimed at developing sensitivity regarding the expressive character of features that are expressive in the secondary sense. In the musical case, this would mean isolating features that are expressive in the secondary sense and allowing students to pair them variously with features that are expressive in the sense described by appearance emotionalism.

In fact, a rudimentary version of such an exercise is already familiar to anyone who has played a tune on an organ, synthesizer, or electronic keyboard, changing the timbre and evaluating the corresponding changes in the expressive character of the piece. In an idealized version of this exercise, the melodic contour and dynamic aspects of the piece would be left untouched and the students required to manipulate the timbre to achieve different expressive results.

V

Davies's reply to my objection is twofold.[23] On the one hand, he doubts that the musical features in question are expressive of any determinate emotion. If they are not, then one cannot fault appearance emotionalism for its failure to cover such cases, for appearance emotionalism is a theory of musical expressiveness and, as such, aims at explaining the musical expression of *emotions*, not of psychological states in general.[24]

On the other hand, and relatedly, Davies believes that I have offered an unfair description of appearance emotionalism, unduly heavy on the phenomenological side:

> Ravasio thinks that appearance emotionalism is committed to a particular phenomenology of the listening experience, one in which we are aware of a resemblance between human expressive behaviour and the dynamics and structures of musical processes. This isn't quite how I think of it. Our immediate awareness is likely to be of the music as

expressive on its own terms. But when I think about why it is so, or how I can justify attributing one expressive character as opposed to another to the music, the resemblance with humanly expressive comportments comes to mind.[25]

I assume that this clarification is meant to suggest that, even granting for the sake of the argument that the cases I described are to fall under the scope of a theory of musical expressiveness, appearance emotionalism fails to account for such cases only if its phenomenology is mistakenly described as containing a necessary reference to emotion characteristics in appearance. But this, Davies makes clear, is not how he conceives of the theory.

VI

My intent in the final part of this paper is to defend my challenge to appearance emotionalism against Davies's two replies. I will question the first reply by appealing to Davies's own characterization of what should count as an emotional state, while the second reply will be challenged on the basis of the discussion of appearance emotionalism offered in the first part of the paper.

The first reply concerns the scope of musical expressiveness. Davies is claiming that appearance emotionalism, as a theory of musical expressiveness, is not committed to accounting for descriptions of music in terms of any possible psychological predicate. For instance, the description of a piece as "neurotic" would qualify as a description of music in psychological terms, but it is one that a theory of musical expressiveness is not meant to cover. So, while I may have a point in claiming that musical features may embody psychological tension, relaxation, and so on in ways that cannot be accounted for by appearance emotionalism, this is not something that could possibly count as a counterexample, as the explanation of such cases is outside the intended scope of a theory of emotional expressiveness in music.

This reply may well work for psychological predicates that have no obvious emotional component. But one may wonder whether excluding cases such as those I mention would not mean to set the bar of what should count as an emotion too high. My examples involve the following psychological description: "elated," for the glissando in Gershwin's *Rhapsody in Blue*; "menacing," for "a saturated, dark timbre, rich in overtones and using a low register"; and "tense," for harmonic intervals such as the tritone.[26] Should these fall within the scope of emotional expression?[27]

The question of what exactly should count as an emotion is too large to be tackled in this article. However, it is worth noting that Davies's own conception of the nature of emotions is favorable to the idea that elation, psychological tension, and a menacing mood should count as emotional states.

In discussing emotional contagion from music to listener, Davies refers with approval to criticism of the standard cognitive theory of emotions.[28] While some emotions may indeed be identified by their intentional object and a belief regarding such an object, as required by the cognitive theory, other emotions do not need either of the two components. A phobia of spiders need not be associated with any belief regarding spiders and may survive one's acquiring the belief that most spiders are harmless. On the other hand, a state of free-floating anxiety does not require an intentional object. According to Davies, emotional contagion from music to listener constitutes another counterexample to the cognitive theory of emotions: sad music has the capacity to make us sad, but our sadness does not have the music as its intentional object; nor is there a relevant belief regarding the music that justifies our sadness.

The point I wish to make is that, especially in the light of Davies's rejection of the cognitive theory of emotion, there is no principled reason for him to reject states such as elation, tension, or a menacing mood as falling outside the scope of a theory of musical expressiveness. In the absence of further clarification regarding the sort of psychological states that music may be said to be expressive of—and that, therefore, would need to be accounted for by a viable theory of musical expressiveness—appearance emotionalism is able to meet the challenge posed by secondary polysemy only if it can account for the cases of emotional expressiveness I describe. This is the strategy that one may pursue in accepting Davies's second reply.

Davies's second reply questions my characterization of what it is to experience expressive music according to appearance emotionalism. While I interpret appearance emotionalism as requiring that the perception of human expressive behavior be part of the phenomenology of music listening, Davies denies that this need be the case. Appearance emotionalism is not committed to such a phenomenological characterization. But this leaves open various possibilities concerning the sort of analysis appearance emotionalism is indeed offering. Davies's suggestion in the passage cited above is that music is heard as expressive "on its own terms." The listener is only likely to become aware of the musical resemblance to human expressive behavior on further reflection.

One may wonder whether this formulation of appearance emotionalism is faithful to the theory as presented in any of the six quotations presented above. Regardless of this, my qualm regards the relation between Davies's contention that we hear music as expressive "on its own terms" and the requirements posed by the thick characterization of appearance emotionalism I outlined above. For, if I am right in holding that appearance emotionalism needs to be committed to the claim that human emotional expression necessarily figures in the phenomenology of music listening, then it follows

that, in whatever way one may interpret Davies's qualification regarding the phenomenological claims advanced by his theory, such a qualification could not result in human emotional expression being excluded from the experience of expressive music, on pain of losing the advantages of the thick reading of appearance emotionalism over the thin one. But it would seem that, for Davies's theory to meet the challenge posed by secondary polysemy, the phenomenological commitments of appearance emotionalism would need to be reduced to the commitment required by the thin characterization or, at any rate, avoid the ones demanded by the thick characterization. However, as shown by the first part of this paper, appearance emotionalism loses in strength and consistency if it abandons the phenomenology mandated by the thick characterization. From this it follows that appearance emotionalism can only successfully account for secondary polysemy if it is modified to such an extent as to lose significant explanatory power and desirable features.

Either one accepts that secondary polysemy may indeed restrict the ambition of appearance emotionalism to count as an all-encompassing theory of musical expressiveness, or one is left with a theory that is intact in its original ambition of generality, but at the same time deprived of some of its explanatory power and distinctive features.

The choice is then between narrowing the scope while preserving the explanatory power and preserving the scope while losing in explanatory power. The appeal of the former option will decrease as alternative unitary theories of musical expressiveness become available, whereas the appeal of the latter option will decrease as viable accounts of expressiveness of the "secondary" sort are put forward.

Notes

1. Matteo Ravasio, "Stephen Davies on the Issue of Literalism," *Debates in Aesthetics* 13, no. 1 (2017): 20–32.
2. Stephen Davies, "Music Matters: Responding to Killin, Ravasio, and Puy," *Debates in Aesthetics* 13, no. 1 (2017): 52–67.
3. Stephen Davies, "The Expression of Emotion in Music," *Mind* 89, no. 353 (1980): 67–86, at 73.
4. Stephen Davies, *Musical Meaning and Expression* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 239.
5. Davies, *Musical Meaning and Expression*, 229.
6. Stephen Davies, "Artistic Expression and the Hard Case of Pure Music," in *Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art*, ed. Matthew Kieran (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 179–91, at 182.
7. Stephen Davies, *The Philosophy of Art* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 151–52.
8. Stephen Davies, "Music and Metaphor," in *Musical Understandings and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 21–34, at 26.

9.   To repeat, I do not deny that the formulations I have grouped under the label of "thick characterization" could be further divided in other subgroups.

10. The minimal characterization recalls a formulation of the relation of music to emotions proposed by Roger Scruton: "It is not that music is analogous to the emotion, but rather the experience of hearing the music is analogous to the experience of hearing the emotion." Roger Scruton, *Art and Imagination* (London: Methuen, 1974), 127.

11. Davies, "Music and Metaphor."

12. Davies, "The Expression of Emotion in Music," 77.

13. "Only a limited range of emotional types can be individuated solely on the basis of observed bodily comportment. . . . Music is expressive because it is experienced as resembling such behaviors, and it can express only the emotion types that they do. Sadness and happiness are the leading candidates, along with timidity and anger. Swaggering arrogance, the mechanical rigidity that goes with repression and alienation from the physicality of existence, ethereal dreaminess, and sassy sexuality are further possibilities." Davies, "Artistic Expression and the Hard Case of Pure Music," 183.

14. This is also evident in excerpts [4] and [5] discussed above.

15. Ravasio, "Stephen Davies on the Issue of Literalism," 23.

16. Some of the cases suggested by Wittgenstein may not present this feature. For a discussion, see Oswald Hanfling, "'I heard a plaintive melody': *Philosophical Investigations*, 209," in *Wittgenstein Centenary Essays*, ed. Allen Phillips Griffiths (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 117–33.

17. Wittgenstein's discussion of this case is contained in Ms-150, especially 14[3] ff. http://www.wittgensteinsource.org.

18. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 16/16e [I, 68]. The same page contains a remark regarding how our use of these words lacks justification: "I see that the word is appropriate even before I know, and even when I never know, *why* it is appropriate." Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, [I, 73].

19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 124–24e [I, 337].

20. Ravasio, "Stephen Davies on the Issue of Literalism," 24. In a recently published book, Saam Trivedi relates that he has on occasion experienced the glissando in Gershwin's *Rhapsody in Blue* "in terms of an imagined, indefinite persona that is wailing or crying through the music." Saam Trivedi, *Imagination, Music, and the Emotions: A Philosophical Study* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2017), 36.

21. Ravasio, 24–25.

22. Ravasio, 26. In an article that appeared shortly after mine, Benenti and Meini discuss what they term "low level expressive features," that is, unarticulated elements such as shapes, lines, color patches, and chords. At least some of these elements may be reinterpreted as examples of secondary polysemy in my sense. Marta Benenti and Cristina Meini, "The Recognition of Emotions in Music and Landscapes: Extending Contour Theory," *Philosophia* 46, no. 3 (2018): 647–64.

23. Davies, "Music Matters," 58.

24. "What I question is the idea that, on their own, tense intervals, dark timbres, and the like are unambiguously expressive. So I also deny that the argument here establishes the subsequent conclusion that music involves modes of expressiveness not covered by appearance emotionalism." Davies, "Music Matters," 58.

25. Davies, "Music Matters, 58–59.

26. Ravasio, "Stephen Davies on the Issue of Literalism," 24–26.

27. In introducing and discussing my article in the special issue where it appeared, Ryan Paul Doran and Shelby Moser observe the following: "[W]hilst tension is not an emotion per se, it certainly seems to be a state that one can feel and

express (much like other affective states that are not fully-fledged emotions, such as moods). As such, there doesn't seem to be any obvious and principled reason why the contour account shouldn't be expected to accommodate such cases." Ryan Paul Doran and Shelby Moser, "Expression, Evolution, and Ontology: Debating the Work of Stephen Davies," *Debates in Aesthetics* 13, no. 1 (2017): 1–10, at 5.

28. Davies, "Emotional Contagion from Music to Listener," in *Musical Understandings and Other Essays on the Philosophy of Music* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 47–65.